1. 02 Mar, 2018 5 commits
  2. 01 Mar, 2018 11 commits
  3. 28 Feb, 2018 10 commits
  4. 27 Feb, 2018 9 commits
  5. 26 Feb, 2018 5 commits
    • Alvaro Herrera's avatar
      Update PartitionTupleRouting struct comment · 364de256
      Alvaro Herrera authored
      Small review on edd44738.
      
      Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20180222165315.k27qfn4goskhoswj@alvherre.pgsql
      Reviewed-by: Robert Haas, Amit Langote
      364de256
    • Tom Lane's avatar
      Schema-qualify references in test_ddl_deparse test script. · fb533e45
      Tom Lane authored
      This omission seems to be what is causing buildfarm failures on crake.
      
      Security: CVE-2018-1058
      fb533e45
    • Tom Lane's avatar
      Last-minute updates for release notes. · 8af38556
      Tom Lane authored
      Security: CVE-2018-1058
      8af38556
    • Peter Eisentraut's avatar
      Fix typo in internal error message · 964bddf1
      Peter Eisentraut authored
      964bddf1
    • Noah Misch's avatar
      Document security implications of search_path and the public schema. · 5770172c
      Noah Misch authored
      The ability to create like-named objects in different schemas opens up
      the potential for users to change the behavior of other users' queries,
      maliciously or accidentally.  When you connect to a PostgreSQL server,
      you should remove from your search_path any schema for which a user
      other than yourself or superusers holds the CREATE privilege.  If you do
      not, other users holding CREATE privilege can redefine the behavior of
      your commands, causing them to perform arbitrary SQL statements under
      your identity.  "SET search_path = ..." and "SELECT
      pg_catalog.set_config(...)" are not vulnerable to such hijacking, so one
      can use either as the first command of a session.  As special
      exceptions, the following client applications behave as documented
      regardless of search_path settings and schema privileges: clusterdb
      createdb createlang createuser dropdb droplang dropuser ecpg (not
      programs it generates) initdb oid2name pg_archivecleanup pg_basebackup
      pg_config pg_controldata pg_ctl pg_dump pg_dumpall pg_isready
      pg_receivewal pg_recvlogical pg_resetwal pg_restore pg_rewind pg_standby
      pg_test_fsync pg_test_timing pg_upgrade pg_waldump reindexdb vacuumdb
      vacuumlo.  Not included are core client programs that run user-specified
      SQL commands, namely psql and pgbench.  PostgreSQL encourages non-core
      client applications to do likewise.
      
      Document this in the context of libpq connections, psql connections,
      dblink connections, ECPG connections, extension packaging, and schema
      usage patterns.  The principal defense for applications is "SELECT
      pg_catalog.set_config('search_path', '', false)", and the principal
      defense for databases is "REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC".
      Either one is sufficient to prevent attack.  After a REVOKE, consider
      auditing the public schema for objects named like pg_catalog objects.
      
      Authors of SECURITY DEFINER functions use some of the same defenses, and
      the CREATE FUNCTION reference page already covered them thoroughly.
      This is a good opportunity to audit SECURITY DEFINER functions for
      robust security practice.
      
      Back-patch to 9.3 (all supported versions).
      
      Reviewed by Michael Paquier and Jonathan S. Katz.  Reported by Arseniy
      Sharoglazov.
      
      Security: CVE-2018-1058
      5770172c