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Commit 8af38556 authored by Tom Lane's avatar Tom Lane
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Last-minute updates for release notes. 

Security: CVE-2018-1058
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doc/src/sgml/release-10.sgml
View file @ 8af38556
......@@ -23,7 +23,23 @@
</para>
<para>
However, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 10.2,
However, if you run an installation in which not all users are mutually
trusting, or if you maintain an application or extension that is
intended for use in arbitrary situations, it is strongly recommended
that you read the documentation changes described in the first changelog
entry below, and take suitable steps to ensure that your installation or
code is secure.
</para>
<para>
Also, the changes described in the second changelog entry below may
cause functions used in index expressions or materialized views to fail
during auto-analyze, or when reloading from a dump. After upgrading,
monitor the server logs for such problems, and fix affected functions.
</para>
<para>
Also, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 10.2,
see <xref linkend="release-10-2"/>.
</para>
</sect2>
......@@ -35,6 +51,92 @@
<listitem>
<!--
Author: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Branch: master [5770172cb] 2018-02-26 07:39:44 -0800
Branch: REL_10_STABLE [ee0d1966e] 2018-02-26 07:39:47 -0800
Branch: REL9_6_STABLE [70396dbe3] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Branch: REL9_5_STABLE [1f47ea7b8] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Branch: REL9_4_STABLE [f28955e38] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Branch: REL9_3_STABLE [41ee473a4] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
-->
<para>
Document how to configure installations and applications to guard
against search-path-dependent trojan-horse attacks from other users
(Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
Using a <varname>search_path</varname> setting that includes any
schemas writable by a hostile user enables that user to capture
control of queries and then run arbitrary SQL code with the
permissions of the attacked user. While it is possible to write
queries that are proof against such hijacking, it is notationally
tedious, and it's very easy to overlook holes. Therefore, we now
recommend configurations in which no untrusted schemas appear in
one's search path. Relevant documentation appears in
<xref linkend="ddl-schemas-patterns"/> (for database administrators and users),
<xref linkend="libpq-connect"/> (for application authors),
<xref linkend="extend-extensions-style"/> (for extension authors), and
<xref linkend="sql-createfunction"/> (for authors
of <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</literal> functions).
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<!--
Author: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Branch: master [582edc369] 2018-02-26 07:39:44 -0800
Branch: REL_10_STABLE [10d598354] 2018-02-26 07:39:47 -0800
Branch: REL9_6_STABLE [e170b8c8c] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Branch: REL9_5_STABLE [91f3ffc52] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Branch: REL9_4_STABLE [928bca1a3] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Branch: REL9_3_STABLE [3db38b0ce] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Author: Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>
Branch: REL9_4_STABLE [461c32b55] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Branch: REL9_3_STABLE [de8ffd666] 2018-02-26 07:39:48 -0800
Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Branch: master [3d2aed664] 2018-02-26 10:18:21 -0500
Branch: REL_10_STABLE [b8a2908f0] 2018-02-26 10:18:22 -0500
Branch: REL9_6_STABLE [815172ba8] 2018-02-26 10:18:22 -0500
Branch: REL9_5_STABLE [a8fc37a63] 2018-02-26 10:18:22 -0500
Branch: REL9_4_STABLE [9f6e5296a] 2018-02-26 10:18:22 -0500
Branch: REL9_3_STABLE [fe8b95b7e] 2018-02-26 10:18:22 -0500
-->
<para>
Avoid use of insecure <varname>search_path</varname> settings
in <application>pg_dump</application> and other client programs
(Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</application>,
<application>pg_upgrade</application>,
<application>vacuumdb</application> and
other <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>-provided applications were
themselves vulnerable to the type of hijacking described in the previous
changelog entry; since these applications are commonly run by
superusers, they present particularly attractive targets. To make them
secure whether or not the installation as a whole has been secured,
modify them to include only the <structname>pg_catalog</structname>
schema in their <varname>search_path</varname> settings.
Autovacuum worker processes now do the same, as well.
</para>
<para>
In cases where user-provided functions are indirectly executed by
these programs &mdash; for example, user-provided functions in index
expressions &mdash; the tighter <varname>search_path</varname> may
result in errors, which will need to be corrected by adjusting those
user-provided functions to not assume anything about what search path
they are invoked under. That has always been good practice, but now
it will be necessary for correct behavior.
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<!--
Author: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net>
Branch: master [bc1adc651] 2018-02-23 22:13:21 -0500
Branch: REL_10_STABLE [b9bf23abb] 2018-02-23 22:09:26 -0500
......@@ -50,8 +152,6 @@ Branch: REL_10_STABLE [b9bf23abb] 2018-02-23 22:09:26 -0500
and <structname>information_schema</structname> tables, which are
supposed to be omitted from the change stream.
</para>
<para>
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
......
doc/src/sgml/release-9.3.sgml
View file @ 8af38556
......@@ -23,7 +23,23 @@
</para>
<para>
However, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 9.3.18,
However, if you run an installation in which not all users are mutually
trusting, or if you maintain an application or extension that is
intended for use in arbitrary situations, it is strongly recommended
that you read the documentation changes described in the first changelog
entry below, and take suitable steps to ensure that your installation or
code is secure.
</para>
<para>
Also, the changes described in the second changelog entry below may
cause functions used in index expressions or materialized views to fail
during auto-analyze, or when reloading from a dump. After upgrading,
monitor the server logs for such problems, and fix affected functions.
</para>
<para>
Also, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 9.3.18,
see <xref linkend="release-9-3-18"/>.
</para>
</sect2>
......@@ -33,6 +49,64 @@
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
Document how to configure installations and applications to guard
against search-path-dependent trojan-horse attacks from other users
(Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
Using a <varname>search_path</varname> setting that includes any
schemas writable by a hostile user enables that user to capture
control of queries and then run arbitrary SQL code with the
permissions of the attacked user. While it is possible to write
queries that are proof against such hijacking, it is notationally
tedious, and it's very easy to overlook holes. Therefore, we now
recommend configurations in which no untrusted schemas appear in
one's search path. Relevant documentation appears in
<xref linkend="ddl-schemas-patterns"/> (for database administrators and users),
<xref linkend="libpq-connect"/> (for application authors),
<xref linkend="extend-extensions-style"/> (for extension authors), and
<xref linkend="sql-createfunction"/> (for authors
of <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</literal> functions).
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Avoid use of insecure <varname>search_path</varname> settings
in <application>pg_dump</application> and other client programs
(Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</application>,
<application>pg_upgrade</application>,
<application>vacuumdb</application> and
other <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>-provided applications were
themselves vulnerable to the type of hijacking described in the previous
changelog entry; since these applications are commonly run by
superusers, they present particularly attractive targets. To make them
secure whether or not the installation as a whole has been secured,
modify them to include only the <structname>pg_catalog</structname>
schema in their <varname>search_path</varname> settings.
Autovacuum worker processes now do the same, as well.
</para>
<para>
In cases where user-provided functions are indirectly executed by
these programs &mdash; for example, user-provided functions in index
expressions &mdash; the tighter <varname>search_path</varname> may
result in errors, which will need to be corrected by adjusting those
user-provided functions to not assume anything about what search path
they are invoked under. That has always been good practice, but now
it will be necessary for correct behavior.
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Fix misbehavior of concurrent-update rechecks with CTE references
......
doc/src/sgml/release-9.4.sgml
View file @ 8af38556
......@@ -23,7 +23,23 @@
</para>
<para>
However, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 9.4.13,
However, if you run an installation in which not all users are mutually
trusting, or if you maintain an application or extension that is
intended for use in arbitrary situations, it is strongly recommended
that you read the documentation changes described in the first changelog
entry below, and take suitable steps to ensure that your installation or
code is secure.
</para>
<para>
Also, the changes described in the second changelog entry below may
cause functions used in index expressions or materialized views to fail
during auto-analyze, or when reloading from a dump. After upgrading,
monitor the server logs for such problems, and fix affected functions.
</para>
<para>
Also, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 9.4.13,
see <xref linkend="release-9-4-13"/>.
</para>
</sect2>
......@@ -33,6 +49,64 @@
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
Document how to configure installations and applications to guard
against search-path-dependent trojan-horse attacks from other users
(Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
Using a <varname>search_path</varname> setting that includes any
schemas writable by a hostile user enables that user to capture
control of queries and then run arbitrary SQL code with the
permissions of the attacked user. While it is possible to write
queries that are proof against such hijacking, it is notationally
tedious, and it's very easy to overlook holes. Therefore, we now
recommend configurations in which no untrusted schemas appear in
one's search path. Relevant documentation appears in
<xref linkend="ddl-schemas-patterns"/> (for database administrators and users),
<xref linkend="libpq-connect"/> (for application authors),
<xref linkend="extend-extensions-style"/> (for extension authors), and
<xref linkend="sql-createfunction"/> (for authors
of <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</literal> functions).
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Avoid use of insecure <varname>search_path</varname> settings
in <application>pg_dump</application> and other client programs
(Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</application>,
<application>pg_upgrade</application>,
<application>vacuumdb</application> and
other <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>-provided applications were
themselves vulnerable to the type of hijacking described in the previous
changelog entry; since these applications are commonly run by
superusers, they present particularly attractive targets. To make them
secure whether or not the installation as a whole has been secured,
modify them to include only the <structname>pg_catalog</structname>
schema in their <varname>search_path</varname> settings.
Autovacuum worker processes now do the same, as well.
</para>
<para>
In cases where user-provided functions are indirectly executed by
these programs &mdash; for example, user-provided functions in index
expressions &mdash; the tighter <varname>search_path</varname> may
result in errors, which will need to be corrected by adjusting those
user-provided functions to not assume anything about what search path
they are invoked under. That has always been good practice, but now
it will be necessary for correct behavior.
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Fix misbehavior of concurrent-update rechecks with CTE references
......
doc/src/sgml/release-9.5.sgml
View file @ 8af38556
......@@ -23,7 +23,23 @@
</para>
<para>
However, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 9.5.10,
However, if you run an installation in which not all users are mutually
trusting, or if you maintain an application or extension that is
intended for use in arbitrary situations, it is strongly recommended
that you read the documentation changes described in the first changelog
entry below, and take suitable steps to ensure that your installation or
code is secure.
</para>
<para>
Also, the changes described in the second changelog entry below may
cause functions used in index expressions or materialized views to fail
during auto-analyze, or when reloading from a dump. After upgrading,
monitor the server logs for such problems, and fix affected functions.
</para>
<para>
Also, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 9.5.10,
see <xref linkend="release-9-5-10"/>.
</para>
</sect2>
......@@ -33,6 +49,64 @@
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
Document how to configure installations and applications to guard
against search-path-dependent trojan-horse attacks from other users
(Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
Using a <varname>search_path</varname> setting that includes any
schemas writable by a hostile user enables that user to capture
control of queries and then run arbitrary SQL code with the
permissions of the attacked user. While it is possible to write
queries that are proof against such hijacking, it is notationally
tedious, and it's very easy to overlook holes. Therefore, we now
recommend configurations in which no untrusted schemas appear in
one's search path. Relevant documentation appears in
<xref linkend="ddl-schemas-patterns"/> (for database administrators and users),
<xref linkend="libpq-connect"/> (for application authors),
<xref linkend="extend-extensions-style"/> (for extension authors), and
<xref linkend="sql-createfunction"/> (for authors
of <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</literal> functions).
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Avoid use of insecure <varname>search_path</varname> settings
in <application>pg_dump</application> and other client programs
(Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</application>,
<application>pg_upgrade</application>,
<application>vacuumdb</application> and
other <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>-provided applications were
themselves vulnerable to the type of hijacking described in the previous
changelog entry; since these applications are commonly run by
superusers, they present particularly attractive targets. To make them
secure whether or not the installation as a whole has been secured,
modify them to include only the <structname>pg_catalog</structname>
schema in their <varname>search_path</varname> settings.
Autovacuum worker processes now do the same, as well.
</para>
<para>
In cases where user-provided functions are indirectly executed by
these programs &mdash; for example, user-provided functions in index
expressions &mdash; the tighter <varname>search_path</varname> may
result in errors, which will need to be corrected by adjusting those
user-provided functions to not assume anything about what search path
they are invoked under. That has always been good practice, but now
it will be necessary for correct behavior.
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Fix misbehavior of concurrent-update rechecks with CTE references
......
doc/src/sgml/release-9.6.sgml
View file @ 8af38556
......@@ -23,7 +23,23 @@
</para>
<para>
However, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 9.6.7,
However, if you run an installation in which not all users are mutually
trusting, or if you maintain an application or extension that is
intended for use in arbitrary situations, it is strongly recommended
that you read the documentation changes described in the first changelog
entry below, and take suitable steps to ensure that your installation or
code is secure.
</para>
<para>
Also, the changes described in the second changelog entry below may
cause functions used in index expressions or materialized views to fail
during auto-analyze, or when reloading from a dump. After upgrading,
monitor the server logs for such problems, and fix affected functions.
</para>
<para>
Also, if you are upgrading from a version earlier than 9.6.7,
see <xref linkend="release-9-6-7"/>.
</para>
</sect2>
......@@ -33,6 +49,64 @@
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
Document how to configure installations and applications to guard
against search-path-dependent trojan-horse attacks from other users
(Noah Misch)
</para>
<para>
Using a <varname>search_path</varname> setting that includes any
schemas writable by a hostile user enables that user to capture
control of queries and then run arbitrary SQL code with the
permissions of the attacked user. While it is possible to write
queries that are proof against such hijacking, it is notationally
tedious, and it's very easy to overlook holes. Therefore, we now
recommend configurations in which no untrusted schemas appear in
one's search path. Relevant documentation appears in
<xref linkend="ddl-schemas-patterns"/> (for database administrators and users),
<xref linkend="libpq-connect"/> (for application authors),
<xref linkend="extend-extensions-style"/> (for extension authors), and
<xref linkend="sql-createfunction"/> (for authors
of <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</literal> functions).
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Avoid use of insecure <varname>search_path</varname> settings
in <application>pg_dump</application> and other client programs
(Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</application>,
<application>pg_upgrade</application>,
<application>vacuumdb</application> and
other <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>-provided applications were
themselves vulnerable to the type of hijacking described in the previous
changelog entry; since these applications are commonly run by
superusers, they present particularly attractive targets. To make them
secure whether or not the installation as a whole has been secured,
modify them to include only the <structname>pg_catalog</structname>
schema in their <varname>search_path</varname> settings.
Autovacuum worker processes now do the same, as well.
</para>
<para>
In cases where user-provided functions are indirectly executed by
these programs &mdash; for example, user-provided functions in index
expressions &mdash; the tighter <varname>search_path</varname> may
result in errors, which will need to be corrected by adjusting those
user-provided functions to not assume anything about what search path
they are invoked under. That has always been good practice, but now
it will be necessary for correct behavior.
(CVE-2018-1058)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Fix misbehavior of concurrent-update rechecks with CTE references
......
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