Second cut attached. This one just adds a boolean option to the existing
function to indicate that implicit schemas are to be included (or not).
I remembered the docs as well this time :-)

Dave Page

I am no longer pursuing a total non-blocking implementation.  I haven't
found a good way to test it with the type of work that I do with
PostgreSQL.  I do use blocking SSL sockets with this mod and have had no
problem whatsoever.  The bug that I fixed in this patch is exceptionally
hard to reproduce reliably.

Jack Bates

>I'd vote for changing WriteBuffer to
>return void, and have it elog() on bad argument.

Manfred Koizar

Oliver Elphick

  SharedBufferChanged
  BufferRelidLastDirtied
  BufferTagLastDirtied
  BufferDirtiedByMe

Manfred Koizar

HeapTupleHeaderData in setter and getter macros called
HeapTupleHeaderGetXmin, HeapTupleHeaderSetXmin etc.

It also introduces a "virtual" field xvac by defining
HeapTupleHeaderGetXvac and HeapTupleHeaderSetXvac.  Xvac is used by
VACUUM, in fact it is stored in t_cmin.

Manfred Koizar

but occasionally I may need to shut down the server and restart it
w/o tcpip sockets. Postmaster has the -i option to turn on tcpip
connections, but it wasn't immediately clear how to easily or
temporarily turn it off (when it's been enabled in postgresql.conf).

In fact, it wasn't clear to me until digging in to postmaster.c that
I could pass '-c tcpip_socket=false' or '--tcpip_socket=false'.
(And then of course when I looked more closely at the man page I
realized I'd missed the proper part of the documentation.) What I'd
been looking for is a flag that would have the opposite effect of
'-i', and it's conceivable that others will be looking for specific
flags to do the opposite of '-F' and '-S'.

I was preparing to add options to postmaster until I realized that
maybe the solution is just to add some documentation.

If you'd rather have 1 character options to accomplish this, I'd be
happy to do that-- adding those 9 lines of code is definitely within
my ability. :)  (Although, the "right" letter to be the opposite of -S
isn't clear to me, since -s is already taken.)

Ron Snyder.

Oliver Elphick

hex digits with no separators, eg 00AABBCCDDEE. This is easily remedied
with the following patch (against 7.2.1):

Mike Wyer

The psql interpreter becomes unstable if variable substitutions
are used.  The debugger GDB was unable to help however mpatrol
reports that the sprintf at mainloop.c:389 is steping one byte
farther than the allocation.

William K. Volkman

>
> > Is it a good idea to provide an example (such as the above), or should I
> > just try and describe the behaviour?
>
> Examples are generally good things ...

OK, the attached documentation patch provides some simple examples of
use of tablename as a parameter, %ROWTYPE and %TYPE.

In the end I decided that the documentation is literally correct, but
hard to follow without any examples explicitly showing the use of a
table name as a parameter.

Andrew McMillan

file.


The program seems to compile ok, but when linking a program that uses
the call,
g++ chokes with an undefined reference error.


If you know how this problem might be fixed, list the solution below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------
I include the code:

Oid PgLargeObject::LOid(){
  return pgObject;
}

in the .cc file.

Chris Traylor

PQExec(" ") in the wrapper around PQnotifies(), fix the Makefile for
the examples so that they will actually compile properly (with the
exception of #5, which depends on internal headers), make a minor change
to libpq++.h so that "make examples" now works on my machine, update
some documentation, fix some grammatical problems, and remove some of
the more hideous comments.

Neil Conway

Remove ODBC-compatible empty parentheses from calls to SQL99 functions
 for which these parentheses do not match the standard.
Update the ODBC driver to ensure compatibility with the ODBC standard
 for these functions (e.g. CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, CURRENT_USER, etc).
Include a new appendix in the User's Guide which lists the labeled features
 for SQL99 (the labeled features replaced the "basic", "intermediate",
 and "advanced" categories from SQL92). features.sgml does not yet split
 this list into "supported" and "unsupported" lists.

Will optimize the case for repeated calls for the same expression,
 which seems to be the most common case. Formerly, always searched
 from the first entry.
May want to look at the least-recently-used algorithm to make sure it
 is identifying the right slots to reclaim. Seems silly to do math when
 it seems that we could simply use an incrementing counter...

on the server, if DebugLvl >= 2.

The patch also includes a late addition to the last patch
(X509_check_private_key()).  I'm not sure why it the currect
revision wasn't tagged.


Bear Giles

If the user has certificates in $HOME/.postgresql/postgresql.crt
and $HOME/.postgresql/postgresql.key exist, they are provided
to the server.  The certificate used to sign this cert must be
known to the server, in $DataDir/root.crt.  If successful, the
cert's "common name" is logged.

Client certs are not used for authentication, but they could be
via the port->peer (X509 *), port->peer_dn (char *) or
port->peer_cn (char *) fields.  Or any other function could be
used, e.g., many sites like the issuer + serial number hash.

Bear Giles

private key.  (You want it to be a regular file owned by the
database process, with 0400 or 0600 permissions.)

Bear Giles

In order to reduce the risk of cryptanalysis during extended
sessions (or brief ones involving a substantial amount of data),
this patch renegotiates the session key after 64kib has been
transferred.

Bear Giles

As the comment headers in be-secure.c discusses, EPH preserves
confidentiality even if the static private key (which is usually
kept unencrypted) is compromised.

Because of the value of this, common default values are hard-coded
to protect the confidentiality of the data even if an attacker
successfully deletes or modifies the external file.

Bear Giles

Attached are a revised set of SSL patches.  Many of these patches
are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes.  The key
differences (from stock 7.2.1) are:

*) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two
   new files,

     src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c
     src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c

   in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files.

*) the legacy code to read and write network data have been
   encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL().  These functions
   should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL
   cases.

   the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified
   earlier, albeit not very cleanly.

*) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the
   new close_SSL() function.  This is necessary for sessions to
   work properly.

   (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing
   the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet
   other SSL tools will be much happier.)

*) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory
   of the user's home directory.  Specifically,

	- the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and
	  allow no access by 'group' or 'other.'

	- the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file
	  owned by the user.

	- the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file
	  owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'.

   At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported.
   There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys.

*) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert.
   Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must*
   match the hostname used by the front-end.  (The cert itself
   should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its
   common name field.)

   This means that

	  psql -h eris db

   will fail, but

	  psql -h eris.example.com db

   will succeed.  At the current time this must be an exact match;
   future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address
   returned by getpeername(2).

   Another common "problem" is expiring certs.  For now, it may be
   a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert.

   As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file
   containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required.

*) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert.
   It allows self-signed certs.  It checks for expiration.  It
   supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing
   valid root certificates.

*) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2.

*) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys.  DSA keys are
   moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider
   them preferable than RSA keys.  (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.)

*) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k
   of randomization data from it.

*) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files

     $DataDir/dh512.pem
     $DataDir/dh1024.pem
     $DataDir/dh2048.pem
     $DataDir/dh4096.pem

   if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded
   parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project.

Remaining tasks:

*) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction
   layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare
   deadlock conditions.  This also touches on a true solution to
   the pg_eof() problem.

*) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited.

*) support encrypted private keys.

*) sessions are not yet fully supported.  (SSL sessions can span
   multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid
   costly renegotiations.)

*) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs.

*) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs.

*) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc.

 *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available.
    This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity
    of the server.

 *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to
    avoid the need to copy these files.

 *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a
    recognized alias.  This is more liberal than the previous
    iteration.

 *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session
    key is periodically renegotiated.

 *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh).  The
    configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type
    of use.

Bear Giles

are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes.  The key
differences (from stock 7.2.1) are:

*) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two
   new files,

     src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c
     src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c

   in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files.

*) the legacy code to read and write network data have been
   encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL().  These functions
   should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL
   cases.

   the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified
   earlier, albeit not very cleanly.

*) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the
   new close_SSL() function.  This is necessary for sessions to
   work properly.

   (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing
   the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet
   other SSL tools will be much happier.)

*) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory
   of the user's home directory.  Specifically,

	- the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and
	  allow no access by 'group' or 'other.'

	- the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file
	  owned by the user.

	- the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file
	  owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'.

   At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported.
   There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys.

*) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert.
   Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must*
   match the hostname used by the front-end.  (The cert itself
   should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its
   common name field.)

   This means that

	  psql -h eris db

   will fail, but

	  psql -h eris.example.com db

   will succeed.  At the current time this must be an exact match;
   future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address
   returned by getpeername(2).

   Another common "problem" is expiring certs.  For now, it may be
   a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert.

   As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file
   containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required.

*) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert.
   It allows self-signed certs.  It checks for expiration.  It
   supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing
   valid root certificates.

*) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2.

*) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys.  DSA keys are
   moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider
   them preferable than RSA keys.  (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.)

*) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k
   of randomization data from it.

*) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files

     $DataDir/dh512.pem
     $DataDir/dh1024.pem
     $DataDir/dh2048.pem
     $DataDir/dh4096.pem

   if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded
   parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project.

Remaining tasks:

*) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction
   layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare
   deadlock conditions.  This also touches on a true solution to
   the pg_eof() problem.

*) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited.

*) support encrypted private keys.

*) sessions are not yet fully supported.  (SSL sessions can span
   multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid
   costly renegotiations.)

*) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs.

*) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs.

*) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc.

 *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available.
    This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity
    of the server.

 *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to
    avoid the need to copy these files.

 *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a
    recognized alias.  This is more liberal than the previous
    iteration.

 *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session
    key is periodically renegotiated.

 *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh).  The
    configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type
    of use.

Bear Giles

undefined (shell) types.

> * Create native Win32 port [win32]

WHERE conditions, if there is no reason to do it differently.

 update to support the new OVERLAY() function.