Fix possible read past end of string in to_timestamp().
to_timestamp() handles the TH/th format codes by advancing over two input characters, whatever those are. It failed to notice whether there were two characters available to be skipped, making it possible to advance the pointer past the end of the input string and keep on parsing. A similar risk existed in the handling of "Y,YYY" format: it would advance over three characters after the "," whether or not three characters were available. In principle this might be exploitable to disclose contents of server memory. But the security team concluded that it would be very hard to use that way, because the parsing loop would stop upon hitting any zero byte, and TH/th format codes can't be consecutive --- they have to follow some other format code, which would have to match whatever data is there. So it seems impractical to examine memory very much beyond the end of the input string via this bug; and the input string will always be in local memory not in disk buffers, making it unlikely that anything very interesting is close to it in a predictable way. So this doesn't quite rise to the level of needing a CVE. Thanks to Wolf Roediger for reporting this bug.
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