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Postgres FD Implementation
Commit b2ce6070 authored by Tom Lane's avatar Tom Lane
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Last-minute release note updates. 

Security: CVE-2012-0866, CVE-2012-0867, CVE-2012-0868
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doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml
View file @ b2ce6070
......@@ -34,6 +34,36 @@
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
Require execute permission on the trigger function for
<command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
</para>
<para>
This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
<literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
comments (Robert Haas)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
......
doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml
View file @ b2ce6070
......@@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
Require execute permission on the trigger function for
<command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
</para>
<para>
This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
<literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
</para>
<para>
Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes. Normally this would
cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
certificate holder to impersonate another. The victim would have to
have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
name has that string as a prefix. Impersonating a server would also
require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
(CVE-2012-0867)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
comments (Robert Haas)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
......
doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml
View file @ b2ce6070
......@@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
Require execute permission on the trigger function for
<command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
</para>
<para>
This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
<literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
</para>
<para>
Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes. Normally this would
cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
certificate holder to impersonate another. The victim would have to
have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
name has that string as a prefix. Impersonating a server would also
require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
(CVE-2012-0867)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
comments (Robert Haas)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
......
doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml
View file @ b2ce6070
......@@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>
Require execute permission on the trigger function for
<command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
</para>
<para>
This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
<literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
as the table owner anyway. (CVE-2012-0866)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
</para>
<para>
Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes. Normally this would
cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
certificate holder to impersonate another. The victim would have to
have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
name has that string as a prefix. Impersonating a server would also
require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
(CVE-2012-0867)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
comments (Robert Haas)
</para>
<para>
<application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script. A name
containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
incorrect. Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
injection risk when the script is reloaded. (CVE-2012-0868)
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
......@@ -576,6 +626,13 @@
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Allow MinGW builds to use standardly-named OpenSSL libraries
(Tomasz Ostrowski)
</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</sect2>
......
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