Use a separate interpreter for each calling SQL userid in plperl and pltcl.

There are numerous methods by which a Perl or Tcl function can subvert
the behavior of another such function executed later; for example, by
redefining standard functions or operators called by the target function.
If the target function is SECURITY DEFINER, or is called by such a
function, this means that any ordinary SQL user with Perl or Tcl language
usage rights can do essentially anything with the privileges of the target
function's owner.

To close this security hole, create a separate Perl or Tcl interpreter for
each SQL userid under which plperl or pltcl functions are executed within
a session.  However, all plperlu or pltclu functions run within a session
still share a single interpreter, since they all execute at the trust
level of a database superuser anyway.

Note: this change results in a functionality loss when libperl has been
built without the "multiplicity" option: it's no longer possible to call
plperl functions under different userids in one session, since such a
libperl can't support multiple interpreters in one process.  However, such
a libperl already failed to support concurrent use of plperl and plperlu,
so it's likely that few people use such versions with Postgres.

Security: CVE-2010-3433

doc/src/sgml/installation.sgml

@@ -167,6 +167,11 @@ su - postgres
       recent <productname>Perl</productname> versions, but it was not
       in earlier versions, and in any case it is the choice of whomever
       installed Perl at your site.
+      If you intend to make more than incidental use of
+      <application>PL/Perl</application>, you should ensure that the
+      <productname>Perl</productname> installation was built with the
+      <literal>usemultiplicity</> option enabled (<literal>perl -V</>
+      will show whether this is the case).
      </para>
 
      <para>

doc/src/sgml/pltcl.sgml

@@ -214,14 +214,36 @@ $$ LANGUAGE pltcl;
      Sometimes it
      is useful to have some global data that is held between two
      calls to a function or is shared between different functions.
-     This is easily done since
-     all PL/Tcl functions executed in one session share the same
-     safe Tcl interpreter.  So, any global Tcl variable is accessible to
-     all PL/Tcl function calls and will persist for the duration of the
-     SQL session.  (Note that <application>PL/TclU</> functions likewise share
-     global data, but they are in a different Tcl interpreter and cannot
-     communicate with PL/Tcl functions.)
+     This is easily done in PL/Tcl, but there are some restrictions that
+     must be understood.
     </para>
+
+    <para>
+     For security reasons, PL/Tcl executes functions called by any one SQL
+     role in a separate Tcl interpreter for that role.  This prevents
+     accidental or malicious interference by one user with the behavior of
+     another user's PL/Tcl functions.  Each such interpreter will have its own
+     values for any <quote>global</> Tcl variables.  Thus, two PL/Tcl
+     functions will share the same global variables if and only if they are
+     executed by the same SQL role.  In an application wherein a single
+     session executes code under multiple SQL roles (via <literal>SECURITY
+     DEFINER</> functions, use of <command>SET ROLE</>, etc) you may need to
+     take explicit steps to ensure that PL/Tcl functions can share data.  To
+     do that, make sure that functions that should communicate are owned by
+     the same user, and mark them <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>.  You must of
+     course take care that such functions can't be used to do anything
+     unintended.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+     All PL/TclU functions used in a session execute in the same Tcl
+     interpreter, which of course is distinct from the interpreter(s)
+     used for PL/Tcl functions.  So global data is automatically shared
+     between PL/TclU functions.  This is not considered a security risk
+     because all PL/TclU functions execute at the same trust level,
+     namely that of a database superuser.
+    </para>
+
     <para>
      To help protect PL/Tcl functions from unintentionally interfering
      with each other, a global
@@ -231,7 +253,9 @@ $$ LANGUAGE pltcl;
      <literal>GD</> be used
      for persistent private data of a function.  Use regular Tcl global
      variables only for values that you specifically intend to be shared among
-     multiple functions.
+     multiple functions.  (Note that the <literal>GD</> arrays are only
+     global within a particular interpreter, so they do not bypass the
+     security restrictions mentioned above.)
     </para>
 
     <para>
@@ -691,8 +715,8 @@ CREATE TRIGGER trig_mytab_modcount BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE ON mytab
         exists, the module <literal>unknown</> is fetched from the table
         and loaded into the Tcl interpreter immediately before the first
         execution of a PL/Tcl function in a database session.  (This
-        happens separately for PL/Tcl and PL/TclU, if both are used,
-        because separate interpreters are used for the two languages.)
+        happens separately for each Tcl interpreter, if more than one is
+        used in a session; see <xref linkend="pltcl-global">.)
        </para>
        <para>
         While the <literal>unknown</> module could actually contain any

doc/src/sgml/release-7.4.sgml

@@ -37,6 +37,43 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Use a separate interpreter for each calling SQL userid in PL/Perl and
+      PL/Tcl (Tom Lane)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This change prevents security problems that can be caused by subverting
+      Perl or Tcl code that will be executed later in the same session under
+      another SQL user identity (for example, within a <literal>SECURITY
+      DEFINER</> function).  Most scripting languages offer numerous ways that
+      that might be done, such as redefining standard functions or operators
+      called by the target function.  Without this change, any SQL user with
+      Perl or Tcl language usage rights can do essentially anything with the
+      SQL privileges of the target function's owner.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      The cost of this change is that intentional communication among Perl
+      and Tcl functions becomes more difficult.  To provide an escape hatch,
+      PL/PerlU and PL/TclU functions continue to use only one interpreter
+      per session.  This is not considered a security issue since all such
+      functions execute at the trust level of a database superuser already.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      It is likely that third-party procedural languages that claim to offer
+      trusted execution have similar security issues.  We advise contacting
+      the authors of any PL you are depending on for security-critical
+      purposes.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Our thanks to Tim Bunce for pointing out this issue (CVE-2010-3433).
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Prevent possible crashes in <function>pg_get_expr()</> by disallowing

doc/src/sgml/release-8.0.sgml

@@ -37,6 +37,43 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Use a separate interpreter for each calling SQL userid in PL/Perl and
+      PL/Tcl (Tom Lane)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This change prevents security problems that can be caused by subverting
+      Perl or Tcl code that will be executed later in the same session under
+      another SQL user identity (for example, within a <literal>SECURITY
+      DEFINER</> function).  Most scripting languages offer numerous ways that
+      that might be done, such as redefining standard functions or operators
+      called by the target function.  Without this change, any SQL user with
+      Perl or Tcl language usage rights can do essentially anything with the
+      SQL privileges of the target function's owner.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      The cost of this change is that intentional communication among Perl
+      and Tcl functions becomes more difficult.  To provide an escape hatch,
+      PL/PerlU and PL/TclU functions continue to use only one interpreter
+      per session.  This is not considered a security issue since all such
+      functions execute at the trust level of a database superuser already.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      It is likely that third-party procedural languages that claim to offer
+      trusted execution have similar security issues.  We advise contacting
+      the authors of any PL you are depending on for security-critical
+      purposes.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Our thanks to Tim Bunce for pointing out this issue (CVE-2010-3433).
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Prevent possible crashes in <function>pg_get_expr()</> by disallowing

doc/src/sgml/release-8.1.sgml

@@ -37,6 +37,43 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Use a separate interpreter for each calling SQL userid in PL/Perl and
+      PL/Tcl (Tom Lane)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This change prevents security problems that can be caused by subverting
+      Perl or Tcl code that will be executed later in the same session under
+      another SQL user identity (for example, within a <literal>SECURITY
+      DEFINER</> function).  Most scripting languages offer numerous ways that
+      that might be done, such as redefining standard functions or operators
+      called by the target function.  Without this change, any SQL user with
+      Perl or Tcl language usage rights can do essentially anything with the
+      SQL privileges of the target function's owner.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      The cost of this change is that intentional communication among Perl
+      and Tcl functions becomes more difficult.  To provide an escape hatch,
+      PL/PerlU and PL/TclU functions continue to use only one interpreter
+      per session.  This is not considered a security issue since all such
+      functions execute at the trust level of a database superuser already.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      It is likely that third-party procedural languages that claim to offer
+      trusted execution have similar security issues.  We advise contacting
+      the authors of any PL you are depending on for security-critical
+      purposes.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Our thanks to Tim Bunce for pointing out this issue (CVE-2010-3433).
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Prevent possible crashes in <function>pg_get_expr()</> by disallowing

doc/src/sgml/release-8.2.sgml

@@ -31,6 +31,43 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Use a separate interpreter for each calling SQL userid in PL/Perl and
+      PL/Tcl (Tom Lane)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This change prevents security problems that can be caused by subverting
+      Perl or Tcl code that will be executed later in the same session under
+      another SQL user identity (for example, within a <literal>SECURITY
+      DEFINER</> function).  Most scripting languages offer numerous ways that
+      that might be done, such as redefining standard functions or operators
+      called by the target function.  Without this change, any SQL user with
+      Perl or Tcl language usage rights can do essentially anything with the
+      SQL privileges of the target function's owner.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      The cost of this change is that intentional communication among Perl
+      and Tcl functions becomes more difficult.  To provide an escape hatch,
+      PL/PerlU and PL/TclU functions continue to use only one interpreter
+      per session.  This is not considered a security issue since all such
+      functions execute at the trust level of a database superuser already.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      It is likely that third-party procedural languages that claim to offer
+      trusted execution have similar security issues.  We advise contacting
+      the authors of any PL you are depending on for security-critical
+      purposes.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Our thanks to Tim Bunce for pointing out this issue (CVE-2010-3433).
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Prevent possible crashes in <function>pg_get_expr()</> by disallowing

doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml

@@ -31,6 +31,43 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Use a separate interpreter for each calling SQL userid in PL/Perl and
+      PL/Tcl (Tom Lane)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This change prevents security problems that can be caused by subverting
+      Perl or Tcl code that will be executed later in the same session under
+      another SQL user identity (for example, within a <literal>SECURITY
+      DEFINER</> function).  Most scripting languages offer numerous ways that
+      that might be done, such as redefining standard functions or operators
+      called by the target function.  Without this change, any SQL user with
+      Perl or Tcl language usage rights can do essentially anything with the
+      SQL privileges of the target function's owner.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      The cost of this change is that intentional communication among Perl
+      and Tcl functions becomes more difficult.  To provide an escape hatch,
+      PL/PerlU and PL/TclU functions continue to use only one interpreter
+      per session.  This is not considered a security issue since all such
+      functions execute at the trust level of a database superuser already.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      It is likely that third-party procedural languages that claim to offer
+      trusted execution have similar security issues.  We advise contacting
+      the authors of any PL you are depending on for security-critical
+      purposes.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Our thanks to Tim Bunce for pointing out this issue (CVE-2010-3433).
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Prevent possible crashes in <function>pg_get_expr()</> by disallowing

doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml

@@ -31,6 +31,43 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Use a separate interpreter for each calling SQL userid in PL/Perl and
+      PL/Tcl (Tom Lane)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This change prevents security problems that can be caused by subverting
+      Perl or Tcl code that will be executed later in the same session under
+      another SQL user identity (for example, within a <literal>SECURITY
+      DEFINER</> function).  Most scripting languages offer numerous ways that
+      that might be done, such as redefining standard functions or operators
+      called by the target function.  Without this change, any SQL user with
+      Perl or Tcl language usage rights can do essentially anything with the
+      SQL privileges of the target function's owner.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      The cost of this change is that intentional communication among Perl
+      and Tcl functions becomes more difficult.  To provide an escape hatch,
+      PL/PerlU and PL/TclU functions continue to use only one interpreter
+      per session.  This is not considered a security issue since all such
+      functions execute at the trust level of a database superuser already.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      It is likely that third-party procedural languages that claim to offer
+      trusted execution have similar security issues.  We advise contacting
+      the authors of any PL you are depending on for security-critical
+      purposes.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Our thanks to Tim Bunce for pointing out this issue (CVE-2010-3433).
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Prevent possible crashes in <function>pg_get_expr()</> by disallowing

doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml

@@ -29,6 +29,43 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Use a separate interpreter for each calling SQL userid in PL/Perl and
+      PL/Tcl (Tom Lane)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This change prevents security problems that can be caused by subverting
+      Perl or Tcl code that will be executed later in the same session under
+      another SQL user identity (for example, within a <literal>SECURITY
+      DEFINER</> function).  Most scripting languages offer numerous ways that
+      that might be done, such as redefining standard functions or operators
+      called by the target function.  Without this change, any SQL user with
+      Perl or Tcl language usage rights can do essentially anything with the
+      SQL privileges of the target function's owner.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      The cost of this change is that intentional communication among Perl
+      and Tcl functions becomes more difficult.  To provide an escape hatch,
+      PL/PerlU and PL/TclU functions continue to use only one interpreter
+      per session.  This is not considered a security issue since all such
+      functions execute at the trust level of a database superuser already.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      It is likely that third-party procedural languages that claim to offer
+      trusted execution have similar security issues.  We advise contacting
+      the authors of any PL you are depending on for security-critical
+      purposes.
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Our thanks to Tim Bunce for pointing out this issue (CVE-2010-3433).
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Improve <function>pg_get_expr()</> security fix so that the function