• Tom Lane's avatar
    Make standard maintenance operations (including VACUUM, ANALYZE, REINDEX, · eedb068c
    Tom Lane authored
    and CLUSTER) execute as the table owner rather than the calling user, using
    the same privilege-switching mechanism already used for SECURITY DEFINER
    functions.  The purpose of this change is to ensure that user-defined
    functions used in index definitions cannot acquire the privileges of a
    superuser account that is performing routine maintenance.  While a function
    used in an index is supposed to be IMMUTABLE and thus not able to do anything
    very interesting, there are several easy ways around that restriction; and
    even if we could plug them all, there would remain a risk of reading sensitive
    information and broadcasting it through a covert channel such as CPU usage.
    
    To prevent bypassing this security measure, execution of SET SESSION
    AUTHORIZATION and SET ROLE is now forbidden within a SECURITY DEFINER context.
    
    Thanks to Itagaki Takahiro for reporting this vulnerability.
    
    Security: CVE-2007-6600
    eedb068c
ri_triggers.c 104 KB